Meanwhile: I deeply hope, but do not expect, the Democratic debate in Las Vegas to spend a lot of time on foreign policy. I hope it will because foreign policy matters enormously, and Hillary Clinton has views that are significantly out of step with her party – and these should be debated. I also hope so because, from a domestic policy perspective, it matters very little which Democrat wins the White House, assuming they win. Yes, the personal priorities and personal capabilities of the candidates matter – and it also matters how big a win they deliver. But it’s not like Hillary Clinton wouldn’t welcome a political dynamic that is more-favorable to organized labor just as Bernie Sanders would, and Sanders would have to deal with a Republican opposition just as Clinton would. The Democratic debate on domestic policy is overwhelmingly about whether now is the time to push the Overton window and, if so, on which issues and how far.

I don’t expect a serious debate on foreign policy because (a) the topic is depressing; (b) it’s not what energizes Democratic voters; (c) only two of the candidates on stage (Clinton and Webb) have strong foreign policy views, and one of them (Clinton) probably sees little political advantage in emphasizing them; and (d) the press is largely ill-prepared to engage on the subject in a productive way.

But: a guy can dream can’t he? So here are my five questions for the Democratic candidates:

1. My first question is the same one I would have asked the Republican candidates. To whit: There have been reports of late that intelligence analysts believe their pessimistic assessments of the fight against the Islamic State are being distorted before being presented to the President and cabinet officials so as to make it look like the President’s policies are working better than they actually are. Similar allegations were made during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and during the Vietnam War before that. How will you, as President, assure yourself that you are getting accurate and not rosy-scenario assessments from those responsible for executing your policies? And how will the uncertainty that you are, in fact, getting good information affect your decision making process when it comes to war and peace?

2. Since the Wilson Administration, Democratic foreign policy thinking has been anchored by the ideal of a world governed by laws, norms and institutions aimed at mitigating and reducing conflict. Both the League of Nations and the United Nations were founded on the idea that collective security is best-achieved when nations with conflicting interests accept constraints on their freedom of action, and see a mutual interest in upholding the norms and rules that impose those constraints which is greater than the opportunities to be seized by flouting them. Do you still believe in that ideal, and in the institutions that embody it? If so, how should the United States demonstrate its own fidelity to those constraints on its freedom of action? And if we do not do so, on what basis do you see other states accepting constraints on their freedom of action?

3. The United States has been at least tacitly, and arguably actively, supportive of Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen. Do you view that war as legal and legitimate? Do you view it as wise? If so, can you draw any clear distinction between Saudi Arabia’s actions in Yemen and Russia’s actions in Syria or Ukraine? On the other hand, if you do not see it as legitimate or wise, how do you think the United States should properly respond when an ally undertakes such an illegal and unwise adventure?

4. The United States has been engaged militarily almost continuously since the end of the Cold War, and with a much greater tempo of operations since 9-11. Can you describe a set of circumstances that would allow the United States to materially reduce its involvement in active military operations around the globe for an extended period of time? Can you describe such a set of circumstances that does not depend on political decisions in other countries over which we have no control – that is to say, can you describe a set of purely military objectives that could be achieved that would allow the United States to significantly reduce its involvement in active military operations for the foreseeable future thereafter? If not, should we assume that you believe that the current military posture of the United States is something we should regard as normal?

5. Are you familiar with the Thucydides Trap? It’s the trap that dominant, hegemonic powers find themselves caught in as they confront a rising power. Maintaining hegemony while a subordinate power gets stronger and stronger is both increasingly expensive (a drain that contributes to the subordinate power’s rise) and generates increasing resentment on the part of the rising power. But failing to maintain hegemony projects weakness, and invites challenge. Thus both aggressive and conciliatory policies may invite conflict with the rising power, with potentially catastrophic consequences. Britain failed to escape the trap when confronted with a rising Germany prior to World War I. The United States failed to escape the trap when confronted with a rising Japan prior to World War II. Do you see a risk of a Thucydides Trap in America’s relations with China today? If so, how do you believe we can keep ourselves from falling into the trap? And, given the potentially catastrophic consequences of failure to avoid falling into the trap, shouldn’t our approach to all our other foreign policy problems really be driven by the overriding goal of avoiding that outcome, even at the expense of other interests?