You singlehandedly changed the debate about institutional capture by the left. But recently, there has been a steady rise of the “fratricidal right”; as you wrote, “The reality is that many of the people in the online right are smart, even brilliant, but not temperamentally equipped for maintaining relationships within an established institution or operating in a very complex, high-conflict public fight.” Could you explain what you meant by that?

The online right has reached a critical moment. From 2015 to 2025, the dissident sphere on the internet was where new ideas were hatched, new memes designed, and new narratives tested. Some of these figures are, in part, responsible for Trump’s victories. But that victory has shifted the calculation and put the online right into a dilemma. Paradoxically, Elon Musk’s takeover of Twitter and cessation of censorship, paired with Trump’s electoral victory, have put the online right into an identity crisis. These figures can no longer ride the edge of discourse in the same way they did when the previous Twitter administration had narrowed the terms of debate. The opening of the Overton Window is good, but the downside is that some figures of the online right, lacking a clearly established edge, have gone over a cliff. This is the Candace Owens phenomenon, in which the disappearance of limits leads to conspiracism and shock content beyond the bounds of rationality.

Other more reasonable accounts are struggling to find their footing now that the Trump administration is in power. The online right’s strength was partly based on a feeling of opposition, a different posture from one of administration. Trump is doing in real life what the online right had only done symbolically. This puts a lot of pressure on those figures and diminishes them, as words have less value after others turn them into deeds. The highest-profile figures in the new political order are those who do things rather than simply make arguments. 

There’s also a fundamental question: The dissident does not always make a good institutionalist. So we will see which figures can jump over that gap. In my experience, there will be many who fail to make the transition. The critic, the dissident, the gadfly are often difficult to assimilate within established institutions, something I’ve observed here as well.

How deep is the sense of entitlement and resentment among a certain section of the right? What are the causes of that?

It’s important to understand that online incentives and electoral incentives are not always aligned. Online, it pays to advance conspiracism, racial hatred, and eccentric political ideologies. These garner attention and can be monetized on various platforms. Candace Owens demonstrated this with her conspiracism about Israel and Brigitte Macron’s genitalia. These narratives are not electorally decisive but are attention-grabbing and can be cashed out on YouTube. Electoral incentives, on the other hand, offer a better payout for simple, meritocratic, and race-neutral ideas, which is why the campaign to abolish DEI and establish colorblind equality has been such an electoral success. These kinds of policy ideas create a universal framework and draw in a diverse coalition without resorting to racial pandering.

How big of a risk is it, and what might be a better path to sustain the grand, meritocratic, borderline race-neutral coalition that Trump seemed to achieve for his electoral victory? 

There is a disconnect between the rhetoric of the online right and the coalition of the MAGA electorate. Certain factions within the right have adopted a Third-World style of racial grievance, resentment, and politics. The groypers are a good example. This is in stark contrast with the actual flesh-and-blood coalition that elected Trump president. Although Trump did indeed have strong support from the working class, especially white working-class men, he won partly by increasing his share of the Latino vote, the Asian vote, and, to a lesser extent, the black male vote. His coalition is especially important because it demonstrates that Latinos are not an electoral lock for Democrats, as black voters have been since the 1960s. Latinos and Asians are also the fastest-growing demographics, so a forward-looking political coalition would make overtures to them rather than seek to divide the coalition explicitly along white–nonwhite lines.

Moving on to higher-education, what comes next? 

Although tariffs are dominating the conversation, the fight for higher education reform is a durable sub-theme for this administration. Trump and his excellent education secretary, Linda McMahon, have taken more decisive action on education than all previous Republican administrations combined. They canceled billions in funding for radical left-wing NGOs, have taken steps to dismantle the Department of Education from within, and withheld hundreds of millions of dollars from universities, which have become breeding grounds for pro-Hamas activism and discriminatory DEI policies. I would like to see the administration continue prototyping reforms in higher education and eventually expand the fight through more aggressive regulatory measures. The administration can not only threaten to withhold funds but can also put universities that violate the Civil Rights Act under consent decrees. There are a number of unused tools that could provide leverage for moving higher education away from ideology and back toward educational excellence.

The framing thus far has focused on anti-Semitism, but this should be seen as only the opening move. The administration has the opportunity to expand the fight more broadly so that all groups are protected by American law and all universities comply with the standard of colorblind equality. The administration should also establish contracts with universities that require them to maintain colorblind equality, set rules for civil discourse, uphold standards of free speech, and adopt a policy of institutional neutrality in order to receive federal funding. These ideas are broadly popular and could result in successful short-term reforms.

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We have seen a reluctance among the right about newer institutions, as institutions in a country as big as the U.S., by definition, need a certain political compromise and big tent that might often go contrary to both the revolutionary and puritanical moment, as well as libertarian instincts about using power towards certain ends. How do we build institutions on the right?

There’s always a question of what to do about institutions, and there are a few options: reform an existing institution, destroy an existing institution, or build a new institution. Conservatives should get comfortable experimenting with all three approaches. It seems the Trump administration is developing a successful method for dismantling institutions that are beyond reform, such as USAID and the Department of Education. But destroying or dismantling an institution is relatively easy. The real challenge for conservatives is reforming existing institutions and building new ones. This requires a different mindset and skill set. It demands becoming more entrepreneurial, not just in business but also in civic and educational institutions. And it raises the question of whether we have the talent to build and staff these organizations.

In my opinion, we are lacking some of this capacity. By temperament, the right has two kinds of personalities ill-suited for this work. The first is the conservative conformist, essential in good times for maintaining and guiding basically healthy institutions. But this conservative type is reluctant to engage in the political fighting required to dramatically reform institutions. The second temperament is the dissident temperament, discussed earlier. These individuals often make trenchant critics but rarely succeed in maintaining or building new institutions, as this requires fundraising, recruiting staff, and selling a vision.  Therefore, the right must develop a third character type, able to handle political conflict like a dissident but also capable of building and maintaining institutions like the institutionalist. Red states, the Trump administration, and conservative donors are working on this, but it is a long, generational project requiring sustained effort. It won’t be easy.